modelcontextprotocol/servers

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Outbound network 2

Environment variables (config / keys) 9

Filesystem writes 8

Shell / command execution 3

Sensitive credential files 3

AI review

The repository contains test code that accesses environment variables and performs filesystem operations, but these are part of legitimate testing and not malicious. The `get-env.ts` tool exposes all environment variables, which could be a concern if deployed in a sensitive context, but it is a reference/demo server. No hidden instructions or prompt injection were found.

medium Environment variable exposure in everything server — src/everything/tools/get-env.ts:34 returns all process.env variables as JSON. This is a demo/reference server, but if used in production, it could leak secrets. Consider documenting this risk or restricting to non-sensitive environments.
low Test code accesses sensitive files and environment — Test files reference /etc/passwd and set environment variables (e.g., TEST_VAR_EVERYTHING, MEMORY_FILE_PATH). These are standard testing patterns and not exploitable in production.
low Subprocess execution in test files — src/filesystem/__tests__/startup-validation.test.ts and structured-content.test.ts use spawn. This is for testing server startup and not a runtime risk.

Model: deepseek-chat

Static findings

Outbound network · Makes outbound network requests

low CLAUDE.md:17 fetch/ Py mcp-server-fetch (web content fetching)

low src/everything/tools/gzip-file-as-resource.ts:195 const response = await fetch(url, { signal: controller.signal });

Shell / command execution · Executes shell / system commands

medium scripts/release.py:42 subprocess.run(

info src/filesystem/__tests__/startup-validation.test.ts:2 import { spawn } from 'child_process';

info src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts:7 import { spawn } from 'child_process';

Environment variables (config / keys) · Reads environment variables (config / API keys)

info src/everything/__tests__/tools.test.ts:164 process.env.TEST_VAR_EVERYTHING = 'test_value';

low src/everything/tools/get-env.ts:34 text: JSON.stringify(process.env, null, 2),

low src/everything/tools/gzip-file-as-resource.ts:12 process.env.GZIP_MAX_FETCH_SIZE ?? String(10 * 1024 * 1024)

low src/everything/transports/sse.ts:74 const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3001;

low src/everything/transports/streamableHttp.ts:201 const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3001;

info src/memory/__tests__/file-path.test.ts:16 originalEnv = process.env.MEMORY_FILE_PATH;

low src/memory/index.ts:16 if (process.env.MEMORY_FILE_PATH) {

info src/sequentialthinking/__tests__/lib.test.ts:21 process.env.DISABLE_THOUGHT_LOGGING = 'true';

low src/sequentialthinking/lib.ts:21 this.disableThoughtLogging = (process.env.DISABLE_THOUGHT_LOGGING || "").toLowerCase() === "true";

Filesystem writes · Reads or writes the filesystem

info src/filesystem/__tests__/directory-tree.test.ts:73 await fs.rm(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });

info src/filesystem/__tests__/path-validation.test.ts:29 await fs.rm(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });

info src/filesystem/__tests__/startup-validation.test.ts:53 await fs.rm(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });

info src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts:50 await fs.rm(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });

low src/filesystem/lib.ts:177 await fs.unlink(tempPath);

info src/git/tests/test_server.py:33 shutil.rmtree(repo_path)

info src/memory/__tests__/file-path.test.ts:31 await fs.unlink(oldMemoryPath);

info src/memory/__tests__/knowledge-graph.test.ts:23 await fs.unlink(testFilePath);

Sensitive credential files · Reads sensitive credential files

info src/filesystem/__tests__/lib.test.ts:170 const testPath = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\file.txt' : '/etc/passwd';

info src/filesystem/__tests__/path-validation.test.ts:75 expect(isPathWithinAllowedDirectories('/etc/passwd', allowed)).toBe(false);

info src/git/src/mcp_server_git/server.py:137 # working tree to prevent path traversal (e.g. '../../etc/passwd' or an

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