modelcontextprotocol/servers

Minor capabilities, nothing alarming.

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Outbound network 2

Environment variables (config / keys) 9

Filesystem writes 8

Shell / command execution 3

Sensitive credential files 3

AI review

The repository contains test code that accesses environment variables and performs filesystem operations, but these are confined to test suites and do not represent runtime risks. The `get-env.ts` tool exposes all environment variables, which could leak secrets if deployed without restriction, but this is part of the 'everything' reference server intended for demonstration, not production use.

medium Environment variable exposure in 'everything' server tool — src/everything/tools/get-env.ts:34 returns JSON.stringify(process.env) to the client, potentially leaking all environment variables including secrets. This is a reference/demo server, but if used in production or connected to sensitive environments, it poses a data exfiltration risk.
low Test code accesses environment variables and performs destructive operations — Multiple test files (e.g., src/filesystem/__tests__/directory-tree.test.ts, src/memory/__tests__/knowledge-graph.test.ts) use fs.rm with force:true and reference sensitive paths like /etc/passwd. These are isolated to test suites and do not affect runtime behavior, but they indicate the codebase handles sensitive paths and destructive operations.
low Subprocess execution in test files — src/filesystem/__tests__/startup-validation.test.ts and structured-content.test.ts import 'spawn' from child_process. This is only used in tests and not in production code, so it does not represent a runtime command injection risk.

Model: deepseek-chat

Static findings

Outbound network · Makes outbound network requests

low CLAUDE.md:17 fetch/ Py mcp-server-fetch (web content fetching)

low src/everything/tools/gzip-file-as-resource.ts:195 const response = await fetch(url, { signal: controller.signal });

Shell / command execution · Executes shell / system commands

medium scripts/release.py:42 subprocess.run(

info src/filesystem/__tests__/startup-validation.test.ts:2 import { spawn } from 'child_process';

info src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts:7 import { spawn } from 'child_process';

Environment variables (config / keys) · Reads environment variables (config / API keys)

info src/everything/__tests__/tools.test.ts:164 process.env.TEST_VAR_EVERYTHING = 'test_value';

low src/everything/tools/get-env.ts:34 text: JSON.stringify(process.env, null, 2),

low src/everything/tools/gzip-file-as-resource.ts:12 process.env.GZIP_MAX_FETCH_SIZE ?? String(10 * 1024 * 1024)

low src/everything/transports/sse.ts:74 const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3001;

low src/everything/transports/streamableHttp.ts:201 const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3001;

info src/memory/__tests__/file-path.test.ts:16 originalEnv = process.env.MEMORY_FILE_PATH;

low src/memory/index.ts:16 if (process.env.MEMORY_FILE_PATH) {

info src/sequentialthinking/__tests__/lib.test.ts:21 process.env.DISABLE_THOUGHT_LOGGING = 'true';

low src/sequentialthinking/lib.ts:21 this.disableThoughtLogging = (process.env.DISABLE_THOUGHT_LOGGING || "").toLowerCase() === "true";

Filesystem writes · Reads or writes the filesystem

info src/filesystem/__tests__/directory-tree.test.ts:73 await fs.rm(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });

info src/filesystem/__tests__/path-validation.test.ts:29 await fs.rm(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });

info src/filesystem/__tests__/startup-validation.test.ts:53 await fs.rm(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });

info src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts:50 await fs.rm(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });

low src/filesystem/lib.ts:177 await fs.unlink(tempPath);

info src/git/tests/test_server.py:33 shutil.rmtree(repo_path)

info src/memory/__tests__/file-path.test.ts:31 await fs.unlink(oldMemoryPath);

info src/memory/__tests__/knowledge-graph.test.ts:23 await fs.unlink(testFilePath);

Sensitive credential files · Reads sensitive credential files

info src/filesystem/__tests__/lib.test.ts:170 const testPath = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\file.txt' : '/etc/passwd';

info src/filesystem/__tests__/path-validation.test.ts:75 expect(isPathWithinAllowedDirectories('/etc/passwd', allowed)).toBe(false);

info src/git/src/mcp_server_git/server.py:137 # working tree to prevent path traversal (e.g. '../../etc/passwd' or an

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